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More than Recognition: 
Why Stakeholding Matters for Reconciliation in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right  
Thom Brooks 
 
Abstract. Hegel’s project of reconciliation is central to his Philosophy of Right. This article 
argues scholars have understood this project in one of two ways, as a form of rational 
reconciliation or a kind of endorsement. Each is incomplete and their inability to capture the 
kind of reconciliation Hegel has in mind is made apparent when we consider the kind of 
problem that the rabble creates for modern society which reconciliation is meant to address. 
The article concludes that more than mutual recognition is required and we should recognise 
the crucial role played by stakeholding, whereby citizens share a principled conviction about 
oneself and other.  
 
Introduction 
It is widely acknowledged that the reconciliation of citizens with their social world is 
important for interpreting Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.1 We should aspire to enjoy our 
individuality in community with others. This project of reconciliation (Versöhnung) requires 
effort to ensure that citizens can see their society as a world worth being reconciled to, which 
makes it necessary that there be social and legal reforms to enable this possibility.  Poverty, 
whereby individuals fail to be reconciled and instead became a “rabble” (Pöbel), is a central 
threat to this project. Hegel says that remedying poverty is an “important question . . .  which 
                                                 
1 G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, eds. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970). All English translations follow G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the 
Philosophy of Right, ed. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) unless stated otherwise 
(hereafter, Philosophy of Right). References will refer to sections (§), remarks (R) and additions (A). Only 
references to the Preface are to page numbers in the English translation. As a naturalized British citizen, I note 
UK spelling used throughout. 
2 
 
agitates and torments modern societies especially.”2 This raises the question how a rabble 
might be avoided and reconciliation secured.  
 This article makes three sets of claims that aim to provide a new perspective on 
Hegel’s project of political reconciliation and how to overcome its central threat. First, it 
challenges the view made by most interpreters that Hegel’s view of poverty is primarily 
economic and materialistic. I will argue that poverty, for Hegel, is best understood as a kind 
of disposition. Economic deprivation might create conditions for making this disposition 
more likely, but it is primarily psychological centred on social and political ‘alienation’ 
(Entfremdung). Secondly, this article will argue that Hegel scholars draw different 
conclusions about Hegel’s understanding of reconciliation by defending two different views: 
rational reconciliation and reconciliation as a kind of endorsement.  
I argue that they all provide an incomplete account insofar as each fails to recognise 
the crucial role played by stakeholding, whereby citizens share a principled conviction about 
oneself and each other mutually identifying themselves as stakeholders.3 While Hegel does 
not specifically use the term “stakeholding,” I will argue that this term captures the kind of 
reconciliation project he has in mind. This argument builds off of the important work of 
British Hegelians, like T. H. Green, and their insights into the kind of problem that a rabble 
creates for modern society as well as how reconciliation might address it. 
Hegel is praised for developing a theory of recognition that continues to play a major 
role in contemporary debates.4 However, it becomes clear in examining his project of 
political reconciliation that we require something more than recognition alone—and, it will 
                                                 
2 See Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §244A. 
3 See Thom Brooks, “Justice as Stakeholding” in Krushil Watene and Jay Drydyk (eds), Theorizing Justice: 
Critical Insights and Future Directions (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016): 115—32.  
4 For example, see Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Grammar of Social Conflicts (Cambridge: 
Polity, 1995) and Alan Patten, Equal Recognition: The Moral Foundation of Minority Rights (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2014). 
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be argued, this gap is filled by acknowledging the place and importance of stakeholding in 
securing reconciliation. 
My argument will proceed as follows. The first section considers the problem of 
poverty as being about alienation. The second section examines the different ways in which 
reconciliation has been understood. The third and fourth sections defend the idea of 
stakeholding as a better way to understand reconciliation and overcoming poverty, including 
some possible objections. 
 
The Problem of Poverty as a Problem of Alienation 
Hegel sees poverty as a significant problem for society whereby affected individuals are 
“more or less deprived of all the advantages of society, such as the ability to acquire skills 
and education in general, as well as the administration of justice, health care, and often even 
the consolation of religion.”5 This section challenges a widely held view that poverty is 
fundamentally an economic problem requiring an economic solution. Instead, I claim that the 
problem of poverty is primarily psychological and rooted in alienation – and so agree with 
Robert Pippin that the Philosophy of Right offers a theory of “non-alienation.”6  
 Hegel’s comments about poverty and how it can foster a “rabble” (Pöbel) are often 
misinterpreted. Hegel says:  
When a large mass of people sinks below the level of a certain standard of living . . . 
that feeling of right, integrity [Rechtlichkeit], and honour which comes from 
                                                 
5 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §241. 
6 Robert B. Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008):  37. 
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supporting oneself by one’s own activity and work is lost. This leads to the creation of 
a rabble.7 
These comments have created a controversy about his understanding of this problem and its 
proposed solution. Commentators, such as Shlomo Avineri, claim that Hegel views poverty 
as an unfortunate, but integral part of any well-functioning market economy. Poverty exists 
not because it is desirable, but because capitalism renders it inevitable.8 In contrast, Raymond 
Plant argues that poverty represents an ever-present threat to the potential achievements that a 
thriving market economy can secure.9 According to Plant, the solution to the problem of 
poverty is finding more employment opportunities for the jobless, among other 
recommendations.10 Both Avineri and Plant view Hegel’s problem of poverty as essentially 
an economic problem about material deprivation — and requiring an economic solution.11 
 Hegel’s concern is about more than the mere satisfaction of material needs. The link 
between poverty and the rabble is not based on the achievement of a standard of living, but in 
possessing a kind of livelihood. For example, he rejects hand-outs from “the wealthier class” 
because it might undermine the “honour” an individual receives through “the feeling of self-
sufficiency.”12 The importance of this feeling is crucial as further passages make clear. 
                                                 
7 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §244. 
8 Shlomo Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972): 148—
54. See Sholomo Avineri, “The Discovery of Hegel’s Early Lectures on the Philosophy of Right”,” The Owl of 
Minerva 16 (1985): 199—208. 
9 Raymond Plant, Hegel: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983): 214—17. 
10 Plant, Hegel, 224—30. See Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory, 172—73. 
11 See Frank Ruda, “That Which Makes Itself: Hegel, Rabble and Consequences” in David James (ed.), Hegel’s 
Elements of the Philosophy of Right: A Critical Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017): 160-
176, at 163 (“Poverty, as a necessary product of the economic dynamic of civil society, provides therefore the 
constantly given condition of the possibility of the rabble’s emergence, of a social existence without honour”). 
12 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §245. 
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 Hegel defends the individual’s “right to live” in his earlier work on the Philosophy of 
Right.13 Here Hegel argues that “the aim of civil society is the actualization of freedom” and 
hence our civil society should be a place where we can actualize our freedom, which creates 
the problem of citizens unable to provide for themselves because civil society fails to make 
freedom possible for them.14 Hegel claims that “this contingency must be overcome by the 
whole community . . . Civil society must keep the poor working” to ensure “that individual 
citizens can satisfy their needs.”15 These comments might suggest that, for Hegel, whether or 
not an individual is in poverty is a matter of lacking sufficient resources. Economic need 
might then play the fundamental role in determining who is (and who is not) in poverty.  
However, the rabble status includes not only individuals suffering with economic 
poverty, but also persons enjoying tremendous financial privileges and advantages.16 Hegel 
says: 
Poverty in itself does not reduce people to a rabble; a rabble is created only by the 
disposition associated with poverty, by inward rebellion against the rich, against 
society, the government, etc.17 
The kind of “poverty” that defines a rabble is not economic by nature, but rather is rooted in 
an individual’s beliefs about the relational identities of the self and others. Thus, a 
fundamental key to unlocking the problem of poverty is recognising that it is primarily 
                                                 
13 G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science: The First Philosophy of Right, trans. J. 
Michael Stewart and Peter C. Hodgson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995): §118R (hereafter, 
Lectures on Natural Right). 
14 Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right, §118R. 
15 Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right, §118R, 120R. 
16 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §244A. See Stephen Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and 
History, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005): 202 (“Hegel points out . . . that the rich can also manifest a ‘rabble’ 
mentality, in so far as they come to regard everything as ‘able to be purchased’ [käuflich für sich], and pursue 
profit and personal gain with a callous indifference to the dignity and welfare of others”). 
17 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §244A. Michael Inwood claims that, for Hegel, alienation involves a loss of 
“individual integrity and independence.” This is incorrect. Alienated individuals are characterised by their 
separation from others: they can live independently with integrity in the conviction they are alienated from 
others. (See Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992): 37. 
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psychological and not materialistic. My sense of alienation matters more than my relative 
wealth.  
For Hegel, all the members of a rabble share a mentality, or more specifically a 
conviction, about their identity in relation to others. This is most likely found, but not 
exclusively, in people at the extremes of wealth and poverty. Allen Wood says, “The poor 
turn into a rabble not through want alone, but through a certain corrupted attitude of mind 
that want tends inevitably to bring with it.”18 Similarly, Dudley Knowles refers to the rabble 
as “an underclass with attitude.”19 The rabble often suffers from a lack of satisfactory 
sustenance in addition to damaged self-respect, but it is their psychological state of mind that 
is held in common — and not their economic status.  
Hegel’s discussion of how an individual might find “his honour in his estate” is 
instructive.20 For Hegel, individuals come together to form a corporation.21 These collectives 
are organized around a trade like a guild and offer individuals a kind of occupational “second 
family.”22 Through working together, a corporation’s members secure their livelihoods. If 
each worked alone, then Hegel says: “He is without the honour of belonging to an estate, his 
isolation reduces him to the selfish aspect of his trade, and his livelihood and satisfaction lack 
stability.”23 The problem is that a lone individual is more exposed to the contingencies of the 
market without a safety net. In working as part of a corporation, such risks are shared and my 
individual flourishing is better “guaranteed.”24 When I have a clear sense of myself as 
identified with an association that provides a particular kind of work answering to a particular 
                                                 
18 Allen W. Wood, “Hegel and Marxism” in Frederick Beiser (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hegel 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 425. 
19 Dudley Knowles, Hegel and the Philosophy of Right (London: Routledge, 2002): 289. 
20 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §253. 
21 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §§250, 252. 
22 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §252. 
23 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §253R. 
24 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §§192A, 253R, 254. 
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set of essential needs, especially if this association has the status of being legally 
acknowledged—as Hegel says it must—then the self-consciousness I develop as a member of 
the association gives me a clear sense of having a stake in my society and as playing an 
essential role in the universal life of my society.25  My work is acknowledged by law as an 
essential part of the nation’s well-being.26 Thus, while our materialistic needs can be a factor, 
it is not determinative of being part of a rabble – only possessing an alienated disposition is 
held in common by all participants in a rabble. 
 This reading clarifies a widespread misunderstanding about two issues. The first is 
that a rabble does not live in bare poverty alone. Instead, it is clear that the rabble can include 
the poorest as well as the very wealthy. A second, related misinterpretation is that economic 
conditions can spark the creation of a rabble by themselves. On the contrary, we see that 
Hegel does not support this determinist view of poverty whereby economic conditions alone 
are to blame whenever a rabble might emerge.  
The relative lack of wealth and resources do not define a rabble — while they may 
often be associated with it, they are not held in common by all who are part of a rabble. 
Instead, we can see that their poverty is found in the shared conviction that they are alienated 
from a society cut-off from them and controlled by others. The presence or absence of a 
conviction about one’s relational identity with others is central to determining whether or not 
someone identifies as an alienated member of a rabble.  
This conviction can be forged through labour. Hegel is clear that the rabble lack “that 
feeling of right, integrity and honour which comes from supporting oneself by one’s own 
activity.”27 The absence of this feeling “leads to the creation of a rabble.”28 The individual 
                                                 
25 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §253R. 
26 My thanks to Ardis Collins for suggesting this argument. 
27 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §244. 
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achieves self-sufficiency through labour not for its own sake, but in pursuit of “the principle 
of civil society” and the development of right.29 In this way, the individuality and 
particularity of a person’s work can be transformed into something universal and belonging 
to principles that connect people to each other in a shared system.30 
Therefore, the “poverty” that a rabble possesses is primarily not a lack of resources, 
but a lack of connectedness with others – it is an absence of being reconciled and at home in 
the state. In short, Hegel understands poverty primarily as a psychological state of mind (a 
poverty of recognition) and not a material condition (economic poverty). Everyone in a 
rabble might not be poor, but they all share a sense of separation and alienation from their 
society. Hegel says that the rabble might not only lack work, but fail “to feel and enjoy the 
wider freedoms, and particularly the spiritual advantages, of civil society.”31 This lack of 
feeling and the “inward rebellion” it provokes is what transforms individuals into a rabble.32 
 Those suffering in economic poverty are likely to not be reconciled where the social 
rules and norms in the state appear distant and alien to them. It is easy to imagine the 
difficulty someone homeless might have in seeing himself or herself reflected in institutions 
governing the possession of property – and the rights enjoyed by those employed in their 
workplace – when that individual lacks ownership or meaningful employment. A poverty 
arising from economic need does not determine whether someone will feel alienated when 
looking at their relation to society as disconnected, but it can, understandably, make such a 
conviction more likely. Therefore, not everyone who is economically poor shares the 
psychological poverty of recognition – and so we should distinguish between the rabble and 
                                                                                                                                                        
28 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §244. 
29 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §245. 
30 My thanks to Ardis Collins for suggesting this point. 
31 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §243. 
32 See Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §§243, 244, 244A. 
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those who are poor even if there may be substantial overlap between these two separate 
groups.33  
 Next we should consider the very wealthy as members of a rabble, or what we might 
call the “rich rabble.” Their extreme wealth can risk influencing their sense of being 
reconciled to a political community with others much less affluent than themselves. The rich 
rabble can view society as an other with rules and norms applicable only to those of lesser 
material means. The rich rabble may perceive their social and political exceptionality because 
of their vast wealth relative to others — which, in turn, fuels their psychological sense of 
disconnection from others in their community. Such individuals will not be reconciled to their 
community and see themselves at home in its institutions. Their affluence does not determine 
whether they lack such a conviction, but it can – as with economic poverty – render it more 
likely. In either case, the fundamental poverty in question concerns a conviction about being 
reconciled and not their relative economic wealth.  
We should likewise distinguish between those who are very wealthy from the rabble 
even if there may be substantial overlap here too. Being poor or very wealthy is no guarantee 
of rabble membership, but having a conviction of myself being alienated from the rest of my 
community is such a guarantee – whatever that individual’s relative wealth. The rabble’s 
membership is open to all even if its members are derived primarily from those at the extreme 
ends of wealth and its lack.  
So, the rabble is not a single, social group. Neither exclusively very poor nor rich, the 
individuals who form a rabble are not a unified membership. They are united only in a belief 
                                                 
33 Hegel says: “In England, even the poorest man believes he has his rights, this differs from what the poor are 
content with in other countries. Poverty in itself does not reduce people to a rabble” (Philosophy of Right, 
§244A). This passage makes clear that it is not poverty, but a disposition of mind that may be often associated 
with, but not reducible to, poverty that makes the difference between non-rabble and rabble. Hegel does not 
believe everyone in poverty is part of a rabble or vice versa. 
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of disconnection between the self and the wider social and political society. How rabble 
members either very poor or rich might react in such circumstances could be very different 
from one another. While neither is reconciled, the very poor might be much less content 
bordering on revolutionary about their perceived position given their desperate material needs 
than others like the very rich who be more content with their understood position. 
 Clarifying the misunderstandings about why the rabble is a problem for reconciliation 
sheds light on the possibility of its being overcome. The members of a rabble lack a 
conviction of connectedness with others and perceive themselves to be isolated from other 
members of the community. They might feel separated from their community despite living 
in relative close physical proximity. At issue is not the material space that might bring them 
together with others in a rabble, but the psychological space where any barriers can be 
overcome through reconciliation.34  
 The consequence is that the common interpretation of poverty in the Philosophy of 
Right as an economic problem of materialistic needs requiring an economic solution is 
incorrect. Material factors might make it more likely that someone may share the disposition 
of alienated disconnection from others that is fundamental to the rabble, but economic 
circumstances does not determine the rabble’s membership. Likewise, meaningful 
employment may help those rabble in economic poverty become reconnected with others, but 
what matters most is whether their disposition changes and not exactly how much they might 
earn relative to others. The problem of poverty is – at its heart – a problem of alienation 
requiring a solution related to one’s psychological convictions about how he or she is 
engaged in relations to others within the community.  
                                                 
34 To emphasise: material, as well as economic considerations are contributing factors for poverty. The essential 
point is that, for Hegel, they do not operate as the primary factor that determines whether or not someone is in a 
state of poverty.  
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 For Hegel, the opposite of being alienated socially and politically is being reconciled 
to one’s social and political world. If individuals are to free themselves from rabble 
membership, then they must become reconciled – and the requisite understanding of 
reconciliation involves a transformation of conscience.35 We do not only understand the 
world in a particular way, but do so with a conviction that helps us avoid “the disposition 
associated with poverty” that afflicts the alienated.36  
 
Hegel on reconciliation: two approaches 
Hegel’s problem of poverty is a problem of alienation – and, for Hegel, the opposite of 
alienation is reconciliation. So a key to unlocking the problem of poverty is to provide a 
solution in the form of reconciliation. However, while Hegel scholars generally accept that 
recognition is important for Hegel’s political philosophy, they disagree about how 
recognition is related to reconciliation within the state.  
 In this section, I identify two different interpretations of reconciliation found in the 
literature. I call these rational reconciliation and reconciliation as an endorsement.37 These 
interpretations are not just different perspectives; they also lead to different conclusions about 
what it means to be reconciled. This section surveys these competing approaches to 
understanding reconciliation in order to map this theoretical terrain and expose the 
inadequacy of each for overcoming the problem of alienation. 
 
                                                 
35 For an outstanding examination of Hegel on matters of conscience that I endorse, see Dean Moyar, Hegel’s 
Conscience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
36 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §244A. 
37 To be clear, this distinction – rational reconciliation versus reconciliation as an endorsement – is bespoke 
and not how Hegel commentators have distinguished their own interpretations before. One aim of this section is 
to indicate that there are broadly two different interpretations of reconciliation in the literature. A second aim is 




Reconciliation is most often interpreted as a form of rational reconciliation. This perspective 
is expressed by a diverse group of commentators, including Robert Pippin, John Rawls and 
Allen Wood. For example, Wood argues: 
Hegel seeks to overcome alienation by rationally reconciling us to the world, 
comprehending a divine reason, akin to our own, immanent in it. Few of Hegel’s 
readers today find it natural to adopt rational theodicy as their fundamental relation to 
their cultural predicament. Accordingly, they should be more willing than he was to 
consider Hegel’s conception of the vocation of modern individuals and its fulfilment 
in the modern state in their practical meaning—as a project in rational ethics.38 
Individuals become reconciled to their social world only after sufficiently comprehending its 
rational composition. Hegel claims that the mutual recognition between self and other is 
possible where each understands his or her self as a rational being, following Wood, that is 
“capable of acting on principles that are universally valid for all selves” that share the same 
rational nature.39 Recognition in modernity is therefore “inherently reciprocal in character” 
because “it is simultaneously to claim the same status for all other persons.”40 
 Reason serves a twofold purpose. It can discern distinctions between subject and 
object as well as between oneself and another; but reason can also reveal their unity. Charles 
Taylor claims that reconciliation is where we rise above opposition “and see the greater 
rational necessity” that dispels divisions.41 Reconciliation is achieved where we comprehend 
concepts in their difference and unity. This requires that the “individual must ultimately come 
                                                 
38 Allen W. Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990): 8 (cited in 
Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy, 5). 
39 Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, 91. 
40 Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, 114. 
41 See Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979): 14, 42. 
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to see himself as the vehicle of universal reason” because reason is the instrument through 
which reconciliation is possible.42 
 Rawls shares this broadly rationalist view of Hegel’s project. For him, Hegel’s 
political philosophy aims “to grasp the social world in thought and to express it in a form in 
which it can be seen by us to be rational.”43  We become reconciled through comprehending 
the rationality within our social world, “gaining insight into its true nature as rational.”44 This 
should be undertaken “with care” to avoid the constant danger our judgement might be 
exercised “corruptly as a defence of an unjust and unworthy status quo.”45 
 The rational reconciliation approach interprets reconciliation as an achievement in 
which we comprehend the world’s intelligibility. We are to understand the rationality of the 
world, and it liberates us: literally, the truth about our social world can set us free. “The point 
of philosophy for Hegel,” says Robert Pippin, “is to comprehend the world, not to change 
it.”46 This is not a change in attitude, but a kind of intellectual attainment.  
For example, Pippin observes that Hegel to some extent “is rehearsing the oldest and 
original premise of ancient rationalism, that to be is to be intelligible.”47  Pippin argues that 
we should not treat Hegel’s theories about recognition and reconciliation “as about a key 
element in the realization of human freedom” as if ”being-loved, being-respected and being-
esteemed were necessary constituents of a free life.”48 This is because according to Pippin the 
issue for Hegel “is not in any conventional sense a psychological one, even primarily a matter 
                                                 
42 Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society, 51. 
43 John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, ed. Barbara Herman (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2000): 331—32. 
44 Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, 334. 
45 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 2001): 
4. 
46 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 272. 
47 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 49. 
48 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 183. 
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of psychological harm.”49 Reconciliation is not a psychological state, but an activity of 
practical reasoning.  
 
Reconciliation as an endorsement 
A second approach builds off the first. It claims reconciliation is not only rational, but a 
particular type of endorsement. This is exemplified in a work by Michael Hardimon. He 
argues that ”Hegel sought to enable the people of the nineteenth century to overcome their 
alienation from the central social institutions—the family, civil society, and the state—and 
come to “be at home” with them” in a “project of reconciliation.”50 Hardimon claims that 
Hegelian reconciliation is attained where individuals can support their social and political 
institutions: “Until and unless one endorses the social world in which one lives, one has not 
attained reconciliation. Reconciled individuals endorse their social world.”51  
This does not require that we support the status quo. Hegel is clear that there is often a 
gap between the social world as it is found and how it should be to warrant our 
endorsement.52 Hegel says: “The state is not a work of art; it exists in the world, and hence in 
the sphere of arbitrariness, contingency, and error, and bad behaviour may disfigure it in 
many respects.”53 For Hardimon, Hegel understands the reconciliation of individuals with 
their social institutions as a result of their deserved endorsement and not a result of 
                                                 
49 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 183. 
50 Michael O. Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994): 1.  
51 Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy, 25. 
52 This is illustrated by Hegel’s famous Doppelsatz—that “What is rational is actual; and what is actual is 
rational” (Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 20). This idea suggests controversially that things only exist insofar as 
their essences become manifest. It helps confirm Hegel’s distinction between the social world as it is found and 
this world as it should be where the latter is more real, or “actual.” See G. W. F. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia 
Logic: Part 1 of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991): 
§6R. 
53 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §258A. 
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resignation: “Philosophy is . . . not consolation; it is more; it reconciles.”54 We can only be 
reconciled to suitably appropriate social institutions that gain our support.  
Although this does not require us to think that “everything is wonderful,” it does 
require us to find our social world a place that we can endorse nonetheless.55 Hegel says: 
To recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present and thereby to delight in the 
present—this rational insight is the reconciliation with actuality which philosophy 
grants to those who have received the inner call to comprehend, to preserve their 
subjective freedom in the realm of the substantial, and at the same time to stand with 
their subjective freedom not in a particular and contingent situation, but in what has 
being in and for itself.56 
According to Hardimon, reconciliation requires acceptance of ‘melancholy’, that our 
institutions can be endorsed despite their flaws.57 Reconciliation is achieved when we are 
satisfied with, but not resigned to our social world.58 This is possible when we realise that the 
pursuit of our individuality can be conducted satisfactorily through our being members of a 
community.59 
 So the differences between understanding Hegel’s project of reconciliation as a kind 
of rational reconciliation versus reconciliation as an endorsement is as follows. The former 
believes reconciliation is achieved through intelligibility: if I can discern the rationality of my 
social world, then I may be reconciled to it. The second view believes that reconciliation 
requires not only our comprehending this rationality, but also our relating to it with some 
                                                 
54 Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy, 87—89 (citing Hegel’s introduction to the Lectures on the Philosophy 
of World History). 
55 Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy, 89. 
56 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 22. 
57 Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy, 90. 
58 See Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, 331. 
59 See Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy, 145. 
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degree of acceptance, even if also with some sense of melancholy. We are reconciled when 
we endorse the intelligibility of our social world.  
 
Preliminary conclusions 
This survey aims to reveal some of the different interpretations available for explaining 
Hegel’s project of reconciliation. It is not meant to be exhaustive, but indicative of the 
diversity of leading views.60 Nor do I argue that these contrasting approaches to 
understanding Hegel’s comments about reconciliation lack overlap with each other. Instead, 
they develop dissimilar perspectives by providing a different emphasis in each case. Rational 
reconciliation might accept the view that reconciliation achieved through reason is a form of 
acceptance. While discussing Hegel’s claim that “when we look at the world rationally, the 
world looks rationally back,” Rawls claims that Hegel “seeks for us reconciliation . . . that is, 
we are to accept and affirm our social world positively, not merely to be resigned to it.”61 We 
may not want to choose sides given the scope for overlap. 
 If reconciliation is supposed to solve the problem of poverty as a problem of 
alienation, then rational reconciliation is inadequate. Recall this statement: “The point of 
philosophy for Hegel,” says Robert Pippin, “is to comprehend the world, not to change it.”62 
However, to leave the rabble it is important not only to see the world differently 
intellectually, but also to possess psychologically a different perspective about the self and 
others. In short, a kind of psychological disposition changes the world for us. A rational 
reconciliation is insufficiently transformative – our comprehending how society works is no 
                                                 
60 Additional approaches might emphasize the sociality central to reconciliation. (See Frederick Neuhouser, 
Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory: Actualizing Freedom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000). 
61 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 3. 
62 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 272. 
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guarantee of our seeing ourselves as being an integrated part of the society.63 The difference 
is not in intellectual comprehension, but in our internal convictions about our connectedness 
to others. Interpreting reconciliation as “rational reconciliation” is therefore inadequate. 
 Reconciliation as an endorsement might appear the better approach. The question is 
whether or not an individual overcomes alienation when he or she accepts or endorses the 
social world. It is clear that a failure to accept or endorse the social world may well be a part 
of having the disposition of alienation. But it is not clear that acceptance of the social world is 
sufficient. Since this form of reconciliation is grounded in an intellectual affirmation, it may 
lack psychological conviction.  
In other words, overcoming alienation is a matter of winning over hearts and minds – 
and reconciliation as an endorsement seems connected more to a state of mind rather than a 
state of the heart. For example, many people might accept, even endorse, their political 
community and its democratic institutions. This is no guarantee that this will prevent the 
widespread feeling of being alienated from political decision-making so that a large number 
of citizens do not show up to vote or become politically inactive.64 Alienation can arise even 
where we accept social and political institutions, if we feel disconnected, have a sense of 
being separated, from them.  
Our endorsement must include a conviction about self and other indicative of 
possessing a certain psychological disposition. It is one thing to be mutually recognised as a 
fellow citizen and endorse this formal equality, but it is another thing to have the conviction 
that this recognition forms an important part of one’s identity. Not any kind of endorsement is 
sufficient – and Hardimon’s understanding of reconciliation as an endorsement is to some 
                                                 
63 See the “The idea of stakeholding” section below. 
64 I do not want to suggest that to not be alienated an individual must become politically active and vote. The 
example is only meant to illustrate one possible sense of alienation.  
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degree incomplete or unclear requiring our going further to incorporate some sense of 
conviction as a requirement for overcoming alienation. Otherwise, this view cannot offer us a 
way out of Hegel’s problem of poverty. 
 While we might each be inclined to emphasise different features in Hegel’s account as 
important, the broad contours of each of these interpretive approaches to his project of 
reconciliation – e.g., rational reconciliation and reconciliation as an endorsement – share a 
common core of understandings that is generally uncontroversial: the importance of reason in 
Hegel’s analysis, and the idea that a rational world—while there will be disagreement about 
the specific features of such a community—is a place worthy of our acceptance. 
 Whether we defend this common core or the different forms of emphasis each 
provides, both views of reconciliation leave open an important gap rendering their account of 
Hegel’s project of reconciliation incomplete. What is missing is the idea that to be reconciled 
is not only to comprehend a form of rationality or to accept the social world without 
resignation, but the claim that reconciliation requires an individual to possess a psychological 
conviction that one has a stake in that society.  
In brief, to be reconciled is to conceive of myself as a stakeholder at home in my 
society, or so I will argue in the next section. I build the case for locating stakeholding in 
Hegel’s account by revealing why alienation is understood as a problem. This discussion 
aims to highlight how alienation might be overcome and how the important role that 
stakeholding and personal identity play in this development becomes clearer within Hegel’s 
project of reconciliation.  
 
Reconciliation and stakeholding 
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As we have seen, Hegel claims that alienation is not determined by our circumstances even if 
this may influence our sense of connectedness between oneself and others. Alienation is 
characterised not by our material well-being, but our disposition – and it is clear that the 
rabble’s “inward rebellion” against society can be based on a failure to comprehend the 
rationality of our institutions.65 Our comprehension of the world is linked with our attitudinal 
disposition: to have the one is to have the other, and if we are alienated from our political 
world this is reflected into our understanding of our position. Yet it remains crucial that we 
recognise that Hegel’s project of reconciliation is not only about a state of mind, but a state of 
heart. Being reconciled means seeing the world and our place within it in a particular way. 
It is insufficient that I merely comprehend a certain state of affairs, but that I adopt a 
psychological attitude about my understanding and self-identity being a unity with. Likewise, 
the reconciliation as an endorsement perspective requires our satisfaction in accepting 
rational social institutions, but neither our endorsement nor mere acceptance can guard 
sufficiently against the danger of alienation as pointed out in the previous section.  
In this section, I argue that stakeholding can help us better understand why alienation 
is a problem and the kind of conviction that reconciliation should include. This contemporary 
terminology is not used by Hegel because it arose much later, in the 1980s, and associated 
with the literature focused on business ethics and corporate governance.66 While it is 
important to set out how stakeholding has been understood in that literature, I argue that the 
concept has clear relevance for identifying a necessary feature of Hegelian reconciliation if it 
is to be the antidote to the problem of poverty. 
 
                                                 
65 See Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §244A. 
66 For example, see R. Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (Boston: Pitman, 
1984) and Will Hutton, The State We’re In (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995). 
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The idea of stakeholding 
In this corporate context, stakeholding concerns securing accountability through 
transparency.67 This approach understood business to be more than a machine for profit 
creation and for seeking as much wealth as possible. The idea is that corporate members 
should be seen as stakeholders where each has a stake in collective decision-making, and act 
as partners engaged in a joint enterprise for mutual benefit. For many, stakeholding is more 
than a model for improving business management.68  It illustrates how a new centre-left view 
of economic justice might be forged in the future.69 
The concept of stakeholding can be removed from its original setting and application 
within corporate governance to provide a useful way of understanding ethics beyond the 
business framework. At its fundamental core, stakeholding is a principled conviction about 
partner relations and shared identity. This ethical sense of stakeholding is of importance for 
us and not the neoliberal models that are traditionally used in discussing stakeholding.70 This 
concept develops from the principle that those who have a stake in outcomes should have a 
say about them.71 Stakeholders in a business are in a kind of partnership where each person 
has a stake in how the business is sustained, and they shape its future together. This requires 
that each person not only possess a stake in outcomes and a say in their determination, but 
also the conviction that each member is recognized as participating in a shared identity as 
stakeholders. 
                                                 
67 See R. Edward Freeman, Jeffrey S. Harrison, Andrew C. Wicks, Bidhan L. Parmar and Simone de Colle, 
Stakeholder Theory: The State of the Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
68 See R. Edward Freeman, Jeffrey S. Harrison and Andrew C. Wicks, Managing for Stakeholders: Survival, 
Reputation, and Success (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). 
69 See Stuart White, “New Labour and the Politics of Ownership” in Patrick Diamond and Michael Kenny (eds), 
Reassessing New Labour: Market, State and Society under Blair and Brown (Oxford: Blackwell, 2011): 142—
43. 
70 I want to suggest that there is more than one way to consider stakeholding and propose that Hegel offers one 
such alternative understanding. By “neoliberal,” I refer to the common understandings of stakeholding found in 
footnote 45 above. 
71 See Brooks, “Justice as Stakeholding.” 
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 This approach improves on existing theories of justice, such as Philip Pettit’s work on 
republican freedom conceived as a form of discursive control.72 Citizens exercise discursive 
control through shared, deliberative engagement where each has the ability and opportunity 
to participate.73 This engagement takes the form of multiple political discourses where 
membership may vary in potentially overlapping debates.74 For Pettit, it is key that each 
citizen “must be able to see their own signature” in their public attitudes and actions: public 
deliberation is not “the work of an alien mechanism,” but a shared activity of free and equal 
persons free from arbitrary domination.75 Republican freedom includes an “authorial 
dimension” whereby citizens are authors of common interests articulated in their politics.76 
 Stakeholding improves on this view. Republicanism claims that non-domination is 
secured through discursive control: citizens enjoy republican freedom where they can 
exercise opportunities for public dialogue without arbitrary interference. Republicans mistake 
opportunities for exercising discursive control through non-domination as freedom. They 
argue that citizens should be held accountable and so have no right to complain if they fail to 
exercise opportunities available to them.  
 The problem is that merely having such opportunities is insufficient. Citizens require 
ability and opportunity, but also the conviction that they themselves are stakeholders. If they 
fail to see their having a stake in deliberative politics, then they may be insufficiently 
motivated to make their views known even where opportunities are widely available. This is 
apparent for many alienated adult citizens in refusing to vote. They may each possess the 
                                                 
72 See Philip Pettit, A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychological to the Politics of Agency (Cambridge: Polity, 
2001): 65—103. 
73 Pettit, A Theory of Freedom, 70. I do not want to suggest that Pettit’s republicanism is the same as Hegel’s 
views on political reconciliation. Pettit’s deliberative democratic model is very different from Hegel’s Idea of 
the State. Yet each recognises the importance of each individual viewing his or her own “signature” in public 
policy. For Hegel, the law is not to be some abstract body of rules imposed from above, but a product of a 
community that each can identify with.  
74 Pettit, A Theory of Freedom, 72. 
75 Pettit, A Theory of Freedom, 79. 
76 Pettit, A Theory of Freedom, 160. 
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same vote and opportunities for voting as everyone else, but still fail to participate where they 
have a conviction they do not have a stake in election outcomes.  
 
Hegelian stakeholding 
Now consider the relevance of stakeholding for Hegel’s project of reconciliation. The 
existence of a rabble should be seen as a failure of stakeholding because the participants do 
not believe that they have a stake in the community and its activities. As a “disposition,” 
breaking free of the rabble mentality should aspire to win over minds, but also hearts.77 The 
rabble opposes their government and wider society because they perceive themselves as 
disconnected: the rabble understands the spheres of politics and their laws as institutions that 
are erected and maintained by others and for others. If I do not see myself as having a stake 
in society, then I will perceive myself as alienated from that society and so the bonds of 
social and political obligation can appear more fragile.78 My social world goes on taking no 
notice of my place in it. The alienated individual may believe him or herself to be socially 
and politically impotent, or even dead to their social world.  
Material conditions can affect, but not determine, the formation of such a conviction. 
The failure to satisfy my basic needs can contribute to my belief that I am alienated from 
others without there being any guarantee of this being the case. Social psychology and not 
economic circumstances alone may better explain why some and not all individuals facing 
financial hardships and related difficulties are more likely to engage in crime, for example.79 
The concept of stakeholding helps clarify why the rabble mentality is a problem for 
                                                 
77 See Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §244A. 
78 I note “appear” because my failing to have a sense of connectedness may be a correct statement of my 
psychological state, but incorrect about the reality whereby others do value my membership in fact despite my 
failure to be convinced of it. 
79 See Thom Brooks, Punishment (London: Routledge, 2012): 144—46, 186—87. 
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reconciliation and how it might be overcome – even though such terminology was not used 
by Hegel. 
 In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel distinguishes between objective law and ”the 
law of the heart.”80 He characterises any gap between them as a “cruel separation” involving 
“separation” because it ”dispenses with the enjoyment of itself in obeying the law, and lacks 
the consciousness of its own excellence in transgressing it.”81 Hegel argues that the law of 
the heart does not seek “bare conformity,” but a more substantial connection: “that in the law 
it has the consciousness of itself, that therein it has satisfied itself.”82 If objective law and the 
law of our hearts identify with each other, there is no longer a separation between the two and 
objective law no longer appears to a citizen as “an alien affair” and “entanglement” with “a 
superior power which is only alien to him.”83 Hegel says that such an individual is “freed 
from himself” through being at home in his or her political state.84 This connects with 
stakeholding: it is not merely that the social world can be a place where I am “at home,” but I 
must possess a certain self-consciousness of myself as being “at home.” I am not reconciled 
until I gain the relevant sense of conviction, such as my having a stake in my society.  
It is essential that we can identify likewise with our social world if we are to be “at 
home” in it. This is not a case of merely following laws laid down by others, but an 
acceptance in our hearts and not only our minds that ends the sense of unbridgeable 
separation between the individual and society. Hegel does not argue that the individual must 
agree with the state, but rather individuals should ideally come to agree with each other about 
living in community and forming a state that lives in the hearts of each person. What is to be 
avoided is our viewing ‘membership in the state as an optional matter’ since, for Hegel it is 
                                                 
80 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. J. N. Findlay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977): 222. 
81 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 222. 
82 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 223. 
83 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 223. 
84 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 223. 
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”only through being a member of the state that the individual [Individuum] himself has 
objectivity, truth and ethical life.”85 
 
Stakeholding matters 
Why does stakeholding matter for reconciliation? Consider the idea found in Hegel’s work 
that our conventions and social roles belong to us because “we have somehow made them our 
own.”86 Hegel calls it “the ethical world . . . the state, or reason, as it actualizes itself in the 
element of self-consciousness.”87 This statement is rich in meaning, but it acknowledges a 
truth that the reconciliation of ourselves and our social world becomes substantiated through 
a particular kind of psychological self-awareness. Convictions about “the concepts of truth 
and the laws of ethics” have significant importance for us, which is why we must endeavour 
to discern which should be endorsed and removed from being “mere opinions.”88  
Hegel’s appeal to grasping that the rational is actual and vice versa in his Doppelsatz 
is characterized as a “conviction” that is “shared by every ingenuous consciousness as well as 
by philosophy.”89 Getting our convictions correct matters – even where it is achieved by 
comprehending the rationality of our institutions. 
 Hegel regularly appeals to the need for us to not only grasp conceptual distinctions, 
but their merit in a unity of form and content. For example, he says that “the idea of right is 
freedom, and in order to be truly apprehended, it must be recognizable in its concept and in 
                                                 
85 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §258R. 
86 Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 68. 
87 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 12—13, 
88 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 19 (“the concepts of truth and the laws of ethics are reduced to mere opinions and 
subjective convictions, and the most criminal principles—since they, too, are convictions—are accorded the 
same status as those laws”). See Hegel, Philosophy of Right,§19R (“man has by nature a drive towards right, 
and also a drive towards property and morality . . . This same content, which appears here in the shape of drives, 
will recur later in another form, namely that of duties”). 
89 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 20. 
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the concept’s existence.”90 Freedom requires intellectual acknowledgement coupled with a 
correct belief about its reality. We must not only understand freedom, but possess a 
conviction about ourselves as free.91  
Hegel says: “The human being who is rational in himself must work through the 
process of self-production both by going out of himself and by educating himself inwardly, in 
order that he may also become rational for himself.”92 Our potential freedom becomes real for 
us when we take ownership of it: when we view it as “that which is mine.”93 Our conceptual 
understanding must correspond to our reality, as we conceive it.94 In other words, we must 
achieve recognition of right for ourselves as our “substantial spirit.”95 This is more than a 
merely intellectual appreciation, but a specific kind of endorsement of our social world where 
we see ourselves as having a stake. 
Mutual recognition is insufficient by itself to protect against alienation. Citizens can 
view each other as equal, yet separate: equal in the sense of acknowledging one another as 
citizens of a shared polity with equal rights and liberties, but separate in denying that all share 
similar life chances and worthwhile opportunities.96 One example is where citizens occupy 
different socio-economic statuses or perceived class. Each may possess the same citizenship 
and carry the same passport, but yet each may hold different convictions about their 
potentially positive relation to the state. Elections are a useful illustration of where the 
comprehension of belonging in terms of having a shared knowledge that one possesses rights 
                                                 
90 Hegel, Philosophy of Right,§1A. 
91 Hegel’s well-known critique of Kantian ethics is at least partly based on the view that Kant’s moral 
philosophy is purely intellectual and divorced from lived experience. This illustrates further the importance in 
Hegel’s approach that we must both comprehend freedom and possess a conviction about ourselves as free. See 
Hegel, Philosophy of Right,§135, 135R and Brooks, Hegel’s Political Philosophy, ‘morality’ chapter. 
92 Hegel, Philosophy of Right,§10A. 
93 See Hegel, Philosophy of Right,§13R. 
94 Hegel, Philosophy of Right,§21A (“Truth in philosophy means that the concept corresponds to reality”). See 
Hegel, Philosophy of Right,§156A (“The ethical is not abstract like the good, but is intensely actual”). 
95 Hegel, Philosophy of Right,§260. 
96 To clarify, merely being separate is not necessarily a case of alienation. However, a conviction of 
separateness without means of coming together is such an instance.  
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and liberties equal to those of others can be very different from the conviction of belonging 
where we endorse and view ourselves as connected to others.97 We can share the same 
comprehension, even accept our political institutions, and yet not all possess a conviction of 
shared belonging.   
To be clear, Hegel does not see mutual recognition as a mere formal equality.  He 
says that mutual recognition is ”a reciprocal recognition which is absolute spirit” and a form 
of “pure knowledge of itself.”98 This can be understood as involving mutual relatedness, of 
seeing oneself in another and another in oneself: “I that is We, and We that is I.”99 But this 
view of mutual recognition refers to shapes of spirit reconciled to each other but not 
necessarily to a political reconciliation of individuals within a state. The concretization of 
identity in the political sphere is lacking and it is this which the concept of stakeholding 
captures. Reconciliation is more than recognition per se, but requires some form of 
stakeholding. 
 
Stakeholding beyond Hegel 
The idea of stakeholding as a principled conviction about the self and others can be supported 
further by the work of several British Idealists, such as T. H. Green.100 This can be instructive 
for showing that earlier Hegelians — sharing a concern about poverty and alienation with the 
need for a compelling account of reconciliation to counter it – also came to recognise the 
                                                 
97 Michael Kenny claims the politics of recognition can foster a sense of belonging. Perhaps it can, but it cannot 
guarantee this sense becomes established as a conviction. If we do not insist on the need for such a conviction, 
then any sense of belonging may be only intellectual and not psychological. This could leave open the possible 
of future alienation if left unaddressed. See Michael Kenny, “Towards a Progressive Politics of ‘Recognition’,” 
Public Policy Research (2011): 175—82. 
98 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 408. 
99 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 110. 
100 The British Idealists are also regularly called the British Hegelians. 
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importance of what we might now call stakeholding, although they did not use this modern 
terminology in the late 19th Century.  
For example, Green describes freedom as “the state in which [an individual] shall 
have realised his ideal of himself, shall be at one with the law which he recognises as that 
which he ought to obey.”101 The free person is an individual reconciled to her political state 
because she understands herself as someone with a stake in society endorsed out of choice 
and not coercion. For Green, freedom is a kind of  “consciousness” that is threatened where 
individuals fail to become reconciled and so come to possess a “consciousness of oneself as 
for ever thwarted.”102 If we understand ourselves as stakeholders, then the law is transformed 
from a coercive institution imposed on us by others towards a deliberative institution 
responsive to our engagement.  
 Green claims that our understanding of our self in relation to others has an impact on 
our sense of self. He describes “the individual’s conception of the society on the well-being 
of which his own depends, and of the constituents of that well-being” which are linked with 
“the laws, institutions, and social expectation” in addition to “conventional morality.”103 
Green argues that the interplay between the self and others provides an important space for 
the exercise of our capacities for deliberative reasoning and the pursuit of individual 
conceptions about “self-perfection, by acting as a member of a social organisation in which 
each contributes to the better-being of all the rest.”104 Our individual well-being is a product 
                                                 
101 T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London: Longmans, 1941): 18 (sect. 18). See 
Thom Brooks, “Ethical Citizenship and the Stakeholder Society” in Thom Brooks (ed.), Ethical Citizenship: 
British Idealism and the Politics of Recognition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014): 125—38. 
102 Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, 18 (sect. 18). 
103 Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, 32 (sect. 6). 
104 Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, 33 (sect. 7). 
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created through the lens of self-beliefs concerning our relations to others in terms of our 
being mutual stakeholders.105 
 Green shares Hegel’s concerns about the creation of a rabble. Green says these 
“dangerous classes” are individuals with “no reverence for the state . . . no sense of an 
interest shared with others in maintaining it.”106 Green is not arguing that all countries should 
be revered wherever they are found: he accepts that where a “state is not a true state” it does 
not warrant our allegiance.107 Instead, his claim is that citizens should recognise their 
obligations to states that enjoy sufficient normative justification. Green acknowledges that 
coercion is unlikely to bring about a change in the rabble: this is because individuals cannot 
be forced to believe they are stakeholders sharing common bonds with others.108 
 Famously, Green claims that “will, not force, is the basis of the state.”109 Legal 
authority, in part, arises from our being party to its creation and reform.110 For Green, each 
individual “must have a share . . . in making and maintaining the laws which he obeys.”111 
Individuals are stakeholders where each can exercise a say about public matters where there 
is a stake in their outcome. 
 
Conclusions  
This discussion identifies the relevance of stakeholding to Hegel, and which can also be 
found in Green.  Notwithstanding their other differences, both are concerned about the threat 
                                                 
105 See Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, 124 (sect. 117) and T. H. Green, Prolegomena 
to ethics, ed. A. C. Bradley (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1969): 212. 
106 Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, 129 (sect. 121). 
107 Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, 138 (sect. 132). 
108 Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, 109 (sect. 98). 
109 Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, 140—41 (sect. 136). 
110 Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, 110, 122 (sects. 99, 113). 
111 Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, 130 (sect. 122). 
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posed by the rabble and its mind set.112 Hegel and Green argue that the rabble mentality can 
be avoided or overcome when possessing a conviction of oneself as a kind of stakeholder. 
This demonstrates not only that the idea of stakeholding is important for an adequate 
understanding of reconciliation that can overcome poverty as a problem of alienation, but that 
this modern terminology, although it might not have been used by Hegel (or Green), 
nonetheless it does cohere with Hegel’s comments about poverty and reconciliation. 
Furthermore, the discussion of Green further clarifies this article’s argument that the problem 
of poverty is primarily a problem of alienation requiring a theory of reconciliation 
incorporating the idea of stakeholding. 
 
Possible objections 
I want to address five possible objections to my central arguments. The first is that the idea of 
stakeholding is alien to Hegel’s philosophy and read into his account rather than located 
within it. It is certainly true that Hegel does not use the words “stakeholder” or 
“stakeholding” or their equivalents in the Philosophy of Right nor elsewhere. However, the 
question is not whether Hegel used the precise term, but whether this contemporary term 
helps us understand ideas found in Hegel’s work. I have made a case for the relevance and, 
indeed, importance of stakeholding for Hegel’s philosophy. The fact that he did not explicitly 
use this term is not conclusive evidence that stakeholding plays no role in our understanding 
of why alienation is a problem for Hegel and how it might be overcome.  
                                                 
112 Green offers insights into how stakeholding and reconciliation come together that usefully illustrate the same 
in Hegel, whose philosophy was a major influence on Green. By noting “notwithstanding their other 
differences,” I simply wish to recognise that Hegel’s philosophy may bear much in common with Green’s and 
especially on this point, but there are differences too. 
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 A second possible objection to my arguments is that the rabble are not stakeholders. 
Perhaps persons identifying as a rabble lack a shared identity as stakeholders with other 
individuals within a political community: they might be correct to believe that they do not, in 
fact, have a stake in this community and its activities. One example is individuals in a state of 
poverty who may come to believe they lack a socio-economic stake. 
 My reply to this challenge is, for Hegel, individuals living in a community with 
shared economic, ethical, political and/or social institutions possess some stake in the 
governance of them. This does not mean that individuals believing themselves to be a rabble 
are to blame for their lack of a conviction about a shared identity. Nonetheless, it does entail 
that the individuals in a shared community work together to make that community a space 
where all can see themselves as stakeholders in it. Stakeholding is not purely subjective, to be 
determined by the judgements of particular individuals isolated from each other. It requires a 
more objective basis: for Hegel, our being at home in the social world requires that the world 
being a place worth reconciling ourselves to.  
Furthermore, individuals who believe they lack a socio-economic stake because of 
their material poverty, which may contribute to the conviction that they are alienated, 
nevertheless do have a stake. The problem is that it is not fulfilled. For Hegel, “no interests of 
the one class may be exalted at the expense of those belonging to another class.”113 If 
material poverty might contribute to the domination of one class by another, then this is not a 
social world that all can be reconciled to. 
The crucial point here is that we become reconciled not because we can see what is in 
it for ourselves, but because we comprehend the rationality of our institutions – and it is only 
then that it enters our intellectual understanding and transforms it into something deeper, such 
                                                 
113 Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right, §120R. 
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as the conviction of ourselves as stakeholders. If the Idea of the State were a place that no one 
could be at home within, then it would not qualify as the Idea of a State. Individuals must see 
their society as a place of belonging with others who identify with the other members of their 
community. Stakeholding is important for understanding Hegel’s project of reconciliation. 
However, stakeholding does not exist separately from our comprehension of right. What is 
right should be recognised as such – and should begiven existence through our convictions 
about ourselves in relation to others in our community. 
A third possible objection to my arguments is that the idea of stakeholding clashes with 
other parts of Hegel’s philosophy. The concern here is that recognizing the importance of 
stakeholding in Hegel’s philosophy may lead us to promote conclusions different from what 
Hegel actually defends. It might, for example, promote a more deliberatively democratic kind 
of politics. This buttresses his comments about the law as the possession of the people, but 
runs counter to his arguments against Athenian democracy and in favour of his distinctive 
brand of constitutional monarchy where popular political participation takes a specific 
shape.114 A second example is that taking seriously the importance of stakeholding might lead 
us to see even more starkly problems with Hegel’s claims that women should not become 
engaged outside the family home.in civil society or the state 
My response is to agree that recognising the importance of stakeholding in Hegel’s 
account exposes more vividly certain tensions within his account. Taking stakeholding 
seriously can offer us insights into certain concerns with his arguments and why they may be 
more pressing than previously recognised, not least because of potential clashes with the 
importance Hegel gives to stakeholding. 
                                                 
114 See Thom Brooks, “Plato, Hegel and Democracy,” Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 53/54 
(2006): 24—50; Thom Brooks, “No Rubber Stamp: Hegel’s Constitutional Monarch,” History of Political 
Thought 28 (2007): 91—119 and Thom Brooks, Hegel’s Political Philosophy: A Systematic Reading of the 
Philosophy of Right, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013). 
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A fourth possible objection is whether the problem of the rabble can be reduced only to a 
problem of rabble-mindedness.115 Hegel claims that a market economy will create “the 
emergence of a mass of people who cannot gain satisfaction for their needs by their work.”116 
Some people will be unable to meet their basic needs – even as members of an ideal state. 
While their material deprivation may not determine whether they feel alienated, such a 
persistent state of want, including joblessness, is a problem whether or not it leads to creating 
a rabble.  
My response is that endemic poverty where individuals lack a realistic prospect of 
meeting their basic needs will be a perfect breeding ground for alienation. If my voice or 
activity makes no difference to my life’s chances, this will foster a psychological sense of 
disconnectedness from others. So there is no denial that material want is a serious problem. 
Nor do I deny that living below any satisfactory minimum threshold bears no connection to 
whether any individual identifies as part of the rabble. Instead, my claim is merely that 
material need is not necessary and sufficient in being causally determinative of a rabble 
mentality. Our circumstances impact our convictions about ourselves in relation to others, but 
they do not compel individuals to only feel alienated or otherwise. 
A final objection is that stakeholding is no different from understanding reconciliation as 
an endorsement. It might be said that endorsing the social world so that I am ‘at home’ is a 
confirmation of my identifying with it and its institutions. Endorsing this social world is to 
recognise my having a stake in it.  
My response is to agree, in part. It is correct to say my having the conviction of 
possessing a stake in society and so self-identifying as a stakeholder is a kind of endorsement 
                                                 
115 I am enormously grateful to Ardis Collins for suggesting this objection. 
116 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §248A. 
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for sure. But where I would disagree is to say that the view of reconciliation as an 
endorsement is either incomplete or vague about the critical importance of conviction. It is 
perhaps incomplete insofar as Hardimon does not discuss the relevance of having any 
particular psychological disposition. It is not enough that I endorse my social world, but that I 
identify myself with it in seeing myself as having a stake in society. I accept this clarification 
is consistent with the overall approach of reconciliation as an endorsement, while still going 
further than the way this approach has been presented to date in the literature. 
 
Conclusion 
This article challenges existing interpretations of Hegel’s problem of poverty and his project 
of reconciliation. It argues against common interpretations of poverty in the Philosophy of 
Right as an economic problem with an economic solution. Instead, it has been argued that the 
problem of poverty is primarily psychological where alienation rather than material 
subsistence is the real issue to be tackled. The article then examined the way commentators 
have understood Hegel’s project of reconciliation. I argued that there are two different 
approaches we can identify – rational reconciliation and reconciliation as an endorsement – 
each inadequate as presented for overcoming the alienation at the heart of the problem of 
poverty. The article claims that stakeholding is centrally important for Hegel’s understanding 
of reconciliation, even though such modern terminology was not available to him at the time 
– and is also found in the writings of other Hegelians like Green. Reconciliation is achieved 
where I see my having a stake in society. 
 Hegel is widely credited for developing a politics of recognition. We can now realise 
that his project of reconciliation requires something more than recognition alone. This is the 
interpretive space that stakeholding occupies as it helps supplement the reconciliation project. 
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Our accepting stakeholding in Hegel’s account comes with costs we should choose to bear. 
While it clashes with certain features of his philosophy, we are left with a Hegelian 
philosophy that is much friendlier to contemporary debates and perhaps illuminates a more 
compelling view of Hegelian justice construed broadly.117 
 
 
                                                 
117 This paper has been presented in different versions at the annual Hegel Society of Great Britain conference in 
Cambridge and a Hegel and Theology conference in Manchester. I am enormously grateful to comments from 
these audiences and, specifically, Ardis Collins, Stephen Houlgate, Dean Moyar, Sebastian Stein, Robert Stern, 
Alison Stone and two anonymous referees for this Journal.  
